• Sublime Core Feed
High Severity

Suspicious invoice reference with missing or image-only attachments

Description

This rule flags emails that reference invoices or payments but have suspicious characteristics: attachments are either missing or only images. It also checks for misleading links disguised as attachments and the presence of invoice-related keywords. The rule looks for potential credential theft or unusual requests, making it a strong indicator of phishing attempts.

References

No references.

Sublime Security
Created Oct 22nd, 2024 • Last updated Dec 2nd, 2025
Source
type.inbound

// more than 0 but less than 20 links
and 0 < length(body.links) < 20

// all attachments are images or there are 0 attachments
and (
  length(attachments) > 0 and all(attachments, .file_type in $file_types_images)
  or length(attachments) == 0
)

// subject contains payment/invoice language
and (
  any(ml.nlu_classifier(subject.subject).tags, .name in ("payment", "invoice"))
  or regex.contains(subject.subject,
                    '(?:\binv(?:oice|o)\b|in_v|in-voice|pay(?:ment|mnt)|pymt|\brec(?:eipt|pt|iept)\b|rcpt|confirm(?:ation)|cnfrm|cnf|po\b|p\.o\.|purch(?:ase)?-?order|\bord(?:er)?\b|bill(?:ing)|billing-info|transact(?:ion)|txn|trx|\bstmt\b|\bstmnt\b|remit(?:tance)|rmt|remndr|remind|\bdue(?:-date)\b|ovrdue|overdue|\bbal(?:ance)\b|\bpaid(?:-invoice)\b|requires\s+your\s+a(?:ttention|ction)|\b[fF]inal\s+(?:[nN]otice|[uU]npaid).{0,20}[iI]nvoice)',
                    // suspicious invoice format
                    '\d{6}\b.{10,30}(\d{2}\.){3}pdf'
  )
)

// link display text ends in a file extension or contain common payment terms
and (
  any(body.links,
      regex.imatch(.display_text,
                   '.*\.(?:doc|docm|docx|dot|dotm|pdf|ppa|ppam|ppsm|ppt|pptm|pptx|wbk|xla|xlam|xlm|xls|xlsb|xlsm|xlsx|xlt|xltm)$'
      )
  )
  or any(body.links,
         regex.icontains(.display_text,
                         '(?:\binv(?:oice|o)\b|in_v|in-voice|pay(?:ment|mnt)|pymt|\brec(?:eipt|pt|iept)\b|rcpt|req(?:uest)|rqst|\brq\b|\bpo\b|p\.o\.|purch(?:ase)?-?order|\bord(?:er)?\b|bill(?:ing)|billing-info|transact(?:ion)|txn|trx|\bstmt\b|\bstmnt\b|remit(?:tance)|rmt|remndr|remind|\bdue(?:-date)\b|ovrdue|overdue|\bbal(?:ance)\b|\bpaid(?:-invoice)\b|completed\s+doc(?:s|ument|uments)?\b)'
         )
  )
  or (
    any(body.links,
        regex.icontains(.display_text, '\bview\s+(invoice|attachment)')
    )
    and any([body.plain.raw, body.html.inner_text],
            any(ml.nlu_classifier(.).intents,
                .name == "cred_theft" and .confidence == "high"
            )
    )
  )
)

// the body references an attachment 
and (
  strings.contains(body.current_thread.text, "attach")
  // negate warning banners warning about the attachment(s)
  and (
    not (
      (
        regex.count(body.current_thread.text, "attach") == 1
        and regex.icontains(body.current_thread.text,
                            "(caution|warning).{0,30}attach"
        )
      )
      or ( // WeTransfer expiry warning notification
        sender.email.email == "noreply@wetransfer.com"
        and any(body.links,
                .display_text == "Don't send me these expiry reminders anymore"
        )
      )
    )
  )
)

// body text is determined to contain cred_theft language by nlu or contains a request with suspicious keywords
and (
  not (
    any(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).topics,
        .name in ("Shipping and Package", "Order Confirmations")
        and .confidence == "high"
    )
  )
  and (
    any(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).intents,
        .name == "cred_theft"
    )
    or any(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).entities,
           .name == "request"
           and (
             strings.icontains(.text, "kindly")
           )
    )
  )
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
  (
    sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
    and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
  )
  or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
and not profile.by_sender().solicited
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