Medium Severity
Open Redirect: adnxs.com
Description
Message contains use of the adnxs.com redirect with getuid parameter. This has been exploited in phishing campaigns to redirect users to malicious sites.
References
No references.
Sublime Security
Created Mar 18th, 2025 • Last updated Apr 28th, 2025
Feed Source
Sublime Core Feed
Source
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
(
.href_url.domain.domain == "ib.adnxs.com"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, '/getuid')
// Make sure the redirect is not going back to adnxs.com
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'getuid\?(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*adnxs\.com(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
)
)
// second form of an open redirect
or (
.href_url.domain.domain == "secure.adnxs.com"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'redir=')
// Make sure the redirect is not going back to adnxs.com
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'redir=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*adnxs\.com(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
)
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "adnxs.com"
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "appnexus.com"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Playground
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