Medium Severity
Fake voicemail notification (untrusted sender)
Description
This rule detects a common credential phishing vector enticing the user to engage with links under the premise that they have a voicemail to retrieve. The rule looks for voicemail verbiage in the display name, body, subject or a combination of those elements with emojis or a medium to high credential theft NLU Intent from first-time + unsolicited sender.
References
No references.
Sublime Security
Created Aug 17th, 2023 • Last updated Jul 16th, 2025
Feed Source
Sublime Core Feed
Source
type.inbound
// contains links or attachments
and (
(0 < length(body.links) <= 25 or 0 < length(distinct(attachments, .md5)) <= 3)
and 0 <= length(distinct(attachments, .md5)) <= 8
)
// the subject or display_name need some keywords which are voicemail related
and (
any([subject.subject, sender.display_name],
regex.icontains(.,
// split phrases that occur within 3 words between or only punctuation between them
'(?:v[nm](\b|[[:punct:]])?|\bvoice(?:mail|message)?|audi[o0]|incoming|missed(?:\sa\s)?|left( a)?|wireless)(?:\w+(\s\w+)?|[[:punct:]]+|\s+){0,3}(?:mail|message|msg|recording|received|notif|support|ca[li1][li1]\d*\b|ca[il1][il1](?:er)?|log|transcript(?:ion)?)\b',
// regex specific to v-mail, v_msg, v,mail, etc
// list of "secondary" words synced with regex above this one
'v[[:punct:]](?:mail|message|msg|recording|received|notif|support|ca[li1][li1]\d*\b|ca[il1][il1](?:er)?|log|transcript(?:ion)?\b)',
// split phrases that start with "caller" that occur within 3 words between or only punctation
'ca[li1][li1](?:er)?(?:\w+(\s\w+)?|[[:punct:]]+|\s+){0,3}(?:v[nm](\b|[[:punct:]])?|\bvoice(?:mail|message)?|audi[o0]|missed(?:\sa\s)?|left( a)?)',
// strong phrases
'(?:open mp3|audi[o0] note|\.wav|left a vm|[^\s]+voip[^\s]*|unanswered.*ca[li1][li1]|incoming.vm|left msg|wireless ca[li1][li1]er|VM Service|voice message|missed.ca[li1][li1](?:e[rd])?|\bca[li1][li1].(?:support|service)(?: for| log)?|missed.{0,10} VM|new voicemail from|new.v.m.from.\+?\d+|new voicemail?(?:\w+(\s\w+)?|[[:punct:]]+|\s+){0,3}transcript(s|ion)?|message received|incoming transmission|voice note)',
// starts in the format of `(4)` and contains some voicemail keywords
'^\(\d\)\s(?:\w+(\s\w+)?|[[:punct:]]+|\s+){0,3}(?:message|voip|voice|unread|call)',
'ca[li1][li1](?:er)?(?:\w+(\s\w+)?|[[:punct:]]+|\s+){0,3}(?:playback|transcript)',
// obfuscated phone number with at least one digit in the area code and at least one obfuscated number in the last group
// 555-555-555X, 555-555-XXXX, 555-5XX-XXXX
'\b1?\(?(\d{3}|\d{2}[\*X]|\d[\*X]{2})\)?[^a-z0-9]{0,2}(\d{2,3}|\d{2}[\*X]|\d[\*X]{2}|[\*X]{2,3})[^a-z0-9]{0,4}(\d{3}[\*X]|\d{2}[\*X]{2}|\d[\*X]{3}|[\*X]{3,4})[^0-9]',
// obfuscated phone number with at least one digit in the prefix
// XXX-555-5555, XXX-5XX-XXXX
'\b1?\(?(\d{2}[\*X]|\d[\*X]{2}|[\*X]{2,3})\)?[^a-z0-9]{0,2}(\d{2,3}|\d{2}[\*X]|\d[\*X]{2})[^a-z0-9]{0,4}(\d{4}|\d{3}[\*X]|\d{2}[\*X]{2}|\d[\*X]{3}|[\*X]{3,4})\b',
)
)
// body.current_thread.text inspection should be very specific to avoid FP
or regex.icontains(strings.replace_confusables(body.current_thread.text),
// body.current_thread.text,
'sent (?:from|by) (?:your )?voice (?:mail )?system',
'(?:new|this) (?:voice(?:mail)?|audi[o0]) (?:message|notification|record)',
'voicemail (is )?attached',
'an? (?:new )?encrypted voicemail',
'a (?:new )?pending message',
'Your? have (?: an?)?incoming voiceRec',
"you(?:\'ve| have) a (?:new )?missed ca[li1][li1]",
'New Voicemail Received',
'New missed ca[li1][li1] record',
'\bvoicemail transcript\b',
'Listen to VoiceMail',
'New voicemail from',
'voice note'
)
// pull out two regexes that could benefit from negations
or (
regex.icontains(body.current_thread.text,
// body.current_thread.text,
'(?:you|we) (?:have |received )+(?:\w+(\s\w+)?|[[:punct:]]+|\s+){0,3}(?:\b|\s+)voice\s?(?:mail|audi[o0]|message|notification)',
'left you a (?:\w+(\s\w+)?|[[:punct:]]+|\s+){0,3}(?:voice(?:mail)?|audi[o0])(?: message|notification)?',
)
and not regex.icontains(body.current_thread.text,
'(?:I(?:\sjust)?|just(?: called you at (?:\d+[[:punct:]])+) and)? left you a (?:\w+(\s\w+)?|[[:punct:]]+|\s+){0,3}(?:voice(?:mail)?|audio)(?: message)?'
)
and not regex.icontains(body.current_thread.text,
'you (?:have |received )my voice\s?(?:mail|audio|message)'
)
)
// Reuse the body.current_thread.text logic against the OCR output of the message screenshot
or (
length(attachments) > 0
and (
all(attachments, .file_type in $file_types_images)
or (
// there is a mix of fake audio attachments and images
length(filter(filter(attachments,
strings.starts_with(.content_type, "audio")
),
// confirm the content type with file.explode
// we have seen attachments claim to be audio/* files, only to be exploded as something else
any(file.explode(.),
not strings.starts_with(.flavors.mime, "audio")
)
)
// the total # of fake audio attachments + the total # of image attachments = the total # of attachments
// meaning, all attachments that are NOT fake audio attachments MUST be images
) + length(filter(attachments, .file_type in $file_types_images)) == length(attachments)
)
)
and any((filter(file.explode(beta.message_screenshot()), .depth == 0)),
regex.icontains(.scan.ocr.raw,
// body.current_thread.text,
'sent (?:from|by) (?:your )?voice (?:mail )?system',
'new (?:voice(?:mail)?|audio) (?:message|notification|record)',
'voicemail (is )?attached',
'an? (?:new )?encrypted voicemail',
'a (?:new )?pending message',
'Your? have (?: an?)?incoming voiceRec',
"you(?:\'ve| have) a (?:new )?missed ca[li1][li1]",
'New Voicemail Received',
'New missed ca[li1][li1] record',
'voicemail transcript(?:ion)?',
'Listen to VoiceMail',
'New voicemail from',
'voice note'
)
or (
regex.icontains(.scan.ocr.raw,
// body.current_thread.text,
'you (?:have |received )*(?:\w+(\s\w+)?|[[:punct:]]+|\s+){0,3}\bvoice\s?(?:mail|audi[o0]|message)',
'left you a (?:\w+(\s\w+)?|[[:punct:]]+|\s+){0,3}(?:voice(?:mail)?|audi[o0])(?: message)?',
)
and not regex.icontains(body.current_thread.text,
'(?:I(?:\sjust)?|just) left you a (?:\w+(\s\w+)?|[[:punct:]]+|\s+){0,3}(?:voice(?:mail)?|audio)(?: message)?'
)
and not regex.icontains(body.current_thread.text,
'you (?:have |received )my voice\s?(?:mail|audio|message)'
)
)
)
)
or strings.icontains(body.html.raw, '<title>Voicemail Notification</title>')
or strings.icontains(body.html.raw, '<!-- Voicemail phone logo')
)
and 2 of (
(
// the sender is a freemail
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $free_email_providers
),
(
any(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).intents,
.name in ("cred_theft") and .confidence in ("medium", "high")
)
or
// use the OCR from the message screenshot
any(filter(file.explode(beta.message_screenshot()), .depth == 0),
any(ml.nlu_classifier(.scan.ocr.raw).intents,
.name in ("cred_theft") and .confidence in ("medium", "high")
)
)
),
(
any(attachments,
.content_type in ("html", "text", "text/html")
and any(ml.logo_detect(file.html_screenshot(.)).brands,
.name in ("Microsoft") and .confidence in ("medium", "high")
)
)
),
(
regex.icontains(sender.display_name,
'(voice|audi[o0]|call|missed|caii)(\s?|-)(mail|message|recording|call|caii)|(transcription|Caller.?ID)'
)
),
// attachment names are often HTML and voice mail related
(
any(attachments,
// this logic is reused below for eml attachments
// ensure updates occur both places
(
.content_type in ("html", "text", "text/html")
or .file_type in ("html", "unknown")
or .file_type == "pdf"
)
and (
regex.icontains(.file_name,
'(?:voice|aud[i1l][o0]|call|missed|caii|mail|message|recording|call|caii|transcr[il1]ption|v[nm]|audi[o0]|play|listen|unheard|msg)',
// contains a time
// 01min , 60secs
'0?[1-9]\s*min(?:(?:ute)?s)?',
'\d{1,2}\s*s(?:ec(?:ond)?s)?',
// (00:50s)
// 3:26 seconds
'[\(\[]?(?:\d{1,2}[\:\s-])\d{1,2}[\)\]]?\s*(?:s(?:(?:ecs?)onds)?)[\)\]]?',
// 03min25secs
'0?[1-9]\s*min(?:(?:ute)?s)?\d{1,2}\s*s(?:ec(?:ond)?s)?',
// [0:39]
// (0:39)
'[\(\[](?:\d{1,2}[\:\s-])\d{1,2}[\)\]]\s',
// contains an emoji
'[\x{1F300}-\x{1F5FF}\x{1F600}-\x{1F64F}\x{1F680}-\x{1F6FF}\x{1F700}-\x{1F77F}\x{1F780}-\x{1F7FF}\x{1F900}-\x{1F9FF}\x{2600}-\x{26FF}\x{2700}-\x{27BF}\x{2300}-\x{23FF}]'
)
// somtimes there is no name, it's just the extension which is also strange
or .file_name in~ (".htm", ".html")
// or sometimes it has no name....
or .file_name is null
)
)
),
// attachment contains javascript
(
any(attachments,
(
.content_type in ("html", "text", "text/html")
or .file_type in ("html", "unknown")
)
and (
(
.size < 1500
and any(file.explode(.), length(.scan.html.scripts) > 0)
)
// bypass the size requirement under these conditions
or (
// sync with https://github.com/sublime-security/sublime-rules/blob/main/detection-rules/attachment_svg_embedded_js.yml
strings.ilike(file.parse_text(.,
encodings=[
"ascii",
"utf8",
"utf16-le"
]
).text,
"*onload*",
"*window.location.href*",
"*onerror*",
"*CDATA*",
"*<script*",
"*</script*",
"*atob*",
"*location.assign*",
"*decodeURIComponent*"
)
)
)
)
),
(
any(attachments,
(
.content_type in ("html", "text", "text/html")
or .file_type in ("html", "unknown")
)
and any(recipients.to,
// the html attachment contains a receipient email address
strings.contains(file.parse_html(..).raw, .email.email)
// the sld of the domain is in the attachment name
or strings.contains(..file_name, .email.domain.sld)
)
)
),
// eml attachments
(
any(filter(attachments, .content_type == "message/rfc822"),
// which contain attachments
// this is the same logic as above
any(file.parse_eml(.).attachments,
(
.content_type in ("html", "text", "text/html")
or .file_type in ("html", "unknown")
or .file_type == "pdf"
)
and (
regex.icontains(.file_name,
'(?:voice|aud[il1][o0]|call|missed|caii|mail|message|recording|call|caii|transcr[il1]ption|v[nm]|audi[o0]|play|listen|unheard|msg)',
// contains a time
// 01min , 60secs
'0?[1-9]\s*min(?:(?:ute)?s)?',
'\d{1,2}\s*s(?:ec(?:ond)?s)?',
// (00:50s)
// 3:26 seconds
'[\(\[]?(?:\d{1,2}[\:\s-])\d{1,2}[\)\]]?\s*(?:s(?:(?:ecs?)onds)?)[\)\]]?',
// 03min25secs
'0?[1-9]\s*min(?:(?:ute)?s)?\d{1,2}\s*s(?:ec(?:ond)?s)?',
// [0:39]
// (0:39)
'[\(\[](?:\d{1,2}[\:\s-])\d{1,2}[\)\]]\s',
// contains an emoji
'[\x{1F300}-\x{1F5FF}\x{1F600}-\x{1F64F}\x{1F680}-\x{1F6FF}\x{1F700}-\x{1F77F}\x{1F780}-\x{1F7FF}\x{1F900}-\x{1F9FF}\x{2600}-\x{26FF}\x{2700}-\x{27BF}\x{2300}-\x{23FF}]'
)
// somtimes there is no name, it's just the extension which is also strange
or .file_name in~ (".htm", ".html")
// or sometimes it has no name....
or .file_name is null
)
)
)
),
// attached eml sender/recipeient/subject are all the same as the outer
// and have an attachment or body links
(
any(filter(attachments, .content_type == "message/rfc822"),
// which contain attachments
// this is the same logic as above
file.parse_eml(.).subject.subject == subject.subject
and file.parse_eml(.).sender.email.email == sender.email.email
and (
length(file.parse_eml(.).recipients.to) == length(recipients.to)
and all(recipients.to,
.email.email in map(file.parse_eml(..).recipients.to,
.email.email
)
)
)
and (
// there are attachments
length(file.parse_eml(.).attachments) > 0
// or body links
or length(filter(file.parse_eml(.).body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain not in $org_domains
and .href_url.domain.root_domain not in $org_domains
)
) > 0
)
)
),
// the body links contain the recipients email
(
length(filter(recipients.to, .email.email != "" or .email.domain.valid)) > 0
and any(body.links,
any(recipients.to,
strings.icontains(..href_url.url, .email.email)
or strings.icontains(..href_url.url, .email.local_part)
)
)
),
(
length(body.current_thread.text) < 700
and regex.icontains(body.current_thread.text,
'Méssãge|Méssage|Recéived|Addréss'
)
),
(
// sender domain matches no body domains
// only inspect "links" that have a display_text and display_url is null to remove "plain text" email address from being caught
length(filter(body.links,
.display_text is not null
and .display_url.url is null
and .href_url.domain.valid
)
) > 0
and all(filter(body.links,
.display_text is not null
and .display_url.url is null
and .href_url.domain.valid
),
.href_url.domain.root_domain != sender.email.domain.root_domain
and .href_url.domain.root_domain not in $org_domains
and .href_url.domain.root_domain not in ("aka.ms")
and .href_url.domain.root_domain not in (
"unitelvoice.com",
"googleapis.com",
"dialmycalls.com",
"ringcentral.biz",
"google.com"
)
)
),
// the body links contain vm related phrases
(
any(body.links,
regex.contains(.display_text, '[^a-z]*[A-Z][^a-z]*')
and regex.icontains(.display_text,
'(v[nm]|voice|audi[o0]|call|missed|caii)(\s?|-)(mail|message|recording|call|caii)|transcription|open mp3|audi[o0] note|listen|playback|\(?(?:\*\*\*|[0-9]{3})?.(?:\*\*\*|[0-9]{3})[^a-z]{0,2}(?:\*{4}|\d+\*+)|play|voice note'
)
// negate FP terms in link display texts
and not strings.icontains(.display_text, 'voice call center')
)
),
(
any(body.links,
.href_url.path == "/ctt"
and regex.icontains(.display_text,
'(v[nm]|voice|audi[o0]|call|missed|caii)(\s?|-)(mail|message|recording|call|caii)|transcription|open mp3|audi[o0] note|listen|playback|\(?(?:\*\*\*|[0-9]{3})?.(?:\*\*\*|[0-9]{3})[^a-z]{0,2}(?:\*{4}|\d+\*+)|play|voice note'
)
// negate FP terms in link display texts
and not strings.icontains(.display_text, 'voice call center')
)
),
// new domains
(
any(body.links,
network.whois(.href_url.domain).days_old < 10
and not strings.icontains(.href_url.path, "unsubscribe")
)
),
// sld use in sender/subject selements
(
any(recipients.to,
// recipient's SLD is in the sender's display name
strings.icontains(sender.display_name, .email.domain.sld)
// recipient's SLD is in the sender's display name
or strings.icontains(subject.subject, .email.domain.sld)
// recipient's SLD is in the senders local_part
or strings.icontains(sender.email.local_part, .email.domain.sld)
)
),
// often times the subject or sender display name will contain time references
(
any([sender.display_name, subject.subject, body.current_thread.text],
regex.icontains(.,
// 01min , 60secs
'0?[1-9]\s*min(?:(?:ute)?s)?\b',
'\d{1,2}\s*s(?:ec(?:ond)?s)?\b',
// (00:50s)
// 3:26 seconds
'[\(\[]?(?:\d{1,2}[\:\s-])\d{1,2}[\)\]]?\s*(?:s(?:(?:ecs?)onds)?)[\)\]]?',
// 03min25secs
'0?[1-9]\s*min(?:(?:ute)?s)?\d{1,2}\s*s(?:ec(?:ond)?s)?',
// [0:39]
// (0:39)
'[\(\[](?:\d{1,2}[\:\s-])\d{1,2}[\)\]]\s'
)
)
// resuse the same logic against ORC output of message_screenshot
or any(filter(file.explode(beta.message_screenshot()), .depth == 0),
regex.icontains(.scan.ocr.raw,
// 01min , 60secs
'0?[1-9]\s*min(?:(?:ute)?s)?\b',
'\d{1,2}\s*s(?:ec(?:ond)?s)?\b',
// (00:50s)
// 3:26 seconds
'[\(\[]?(?:\d{1,2}[\:\s-])\d{1,2}[\)\]]?\s*(?:s(?:(?:ecs?)onds)?)[\)\]]?',
// 03min25secs
'0?[1-9]\s*min(?:(?:ute)?s)?\d{1,2}\s*s(?:ec(?:ond)?s)?',
// [0:39]
// (0:39)
'[\(\[](?:\d{1,2}[\:\s-])\d{1,2}[\)\]]\s'
)
)
),
// often times the subject or sender display name will contain dates
(
any([sender.display_name, subject.subject],
// days of week
any([
'monday',
'tuesday',
'wednesday',
'thursday',
'friday',
'saturday',
'sunday'
],
strings.icontains(.., .)
)
// months
// may is problematic for words like "Mayor", "Maybe", "MayFlower", etc
or any([
"January",
"February",
"March",
"April",
"June",
"July",
"August",
"September",
"October",
"November",
"December"
],
strings.icontains(.., .)
)
// use a regex for May
or regex.icontains(., '\bmay\b')
// common date formats
or regex.contains(.,
// YYYY-MM-DD or YY-MM-DD (ISO 8601 format)
'\d{2}(\d{2})?-(0[1-9]|1[0-2])-(0[1-9]|[12]\d|3[01])',
// MM/DD/YYYY or MM/DD/YY (US format)
'(0[1-9]|1[0-2])/(0[1-9]|[12]\d|3[01])/\d{2}(\d{2})?',
// DD/MM/YYYY or DD/MM/YY (European format)
'(0[1-9]|[12]\d|3[01])/(0[1-9]|1[0-2])/\d{2}(\d{2})?',
// Month DD, YYYY or Month DD, YY (e.g., March 15, 2024 or March 15, 24)
'(January|February|March|April|May|June|July|August|September|October|November|December) (0[1-9]|[12]\d|3[01]), \d{2}(\d{2})?'
)
// common time formats
or regex.contains(.,
// Example: 23:45, 08:30
'([01]\d|2[0-3]):([0-5]\d)',
// Example: 23:45:59, 08:30:12
'([01]\d|2[0-3]):([0-5]\d):([0-5]\d)',
// Example: 08:30 AM, 12:45 pm
'(0[1-9]|1[0-2]):([0-5]\d)\s?([AaPp][Mm])',
// Example: 08:30 AM, 12:45 pm
'(0[1-9]|1[0-2]):([0-5]\d):([0-5]\d) ?([AaPp][Mm])'
)
)
// or use the OCR results from beta.message_screenshot
or any(filter(file.explode(beta.message_screenshot()), .depth == 0),
// days of week
any([
'monday',
'tuesday',
'wednesday',
'thursday',
'friday',
'saturday',
'sunday'
],
strings.icontains(..scan.ocr.raw, .)
)
// months
// may is problematic for words like "Mayor", "Maybe", "MayFlower", etc
or any([
"January",
"February",
"March",
"April",
"June",
"July",
"August",
"September",
"October",
"November",
"December"
],
strings.icontains(..scan.ocr.raw, .)
)
// use a regex for May
or regex.contains(.scan.ocr.raw, '\bMay\b')
// common date formats
or regex.contains(.scan.ocr.raw,
// YYYY-MM-DD or YY-MM-DD (ISO 8601 format)
'\d{2}(\d{2})?-(0[1-9]|1[0-2])-(0[1-9]|[12]\d|3[01])',
// MM/DD/YYYY or MM/DD/YY (US format)
'(0[1-9]|1[0-2])/(0[1-9]|[12]\d|3[01])/\d{2}(\d{2})?',
// DD/MM/YYYY or DD/MM/YY (European format)
'(0[1-9]|[12]\d|3[01])/(0[1-9]|1[0-2])/\d{2}(\d{2})?',
// Month DD, YYYY or Month DD, YY (e.g., March 15, 2024 or March 15, 24)
'(January|February|March|April|May|June|July|August|September|October|November|December) (0[1-9]|[12]\d|3[01]), \d{2}(\d{2})?'
)
// common time formats
or regex.contains(.scan.ocr.raw,
// Example: 23:45, 08:30
'([01]\d|2[0-3]):([0-5]\d)',
// Example: 23:45:59, 08:30:12
'([01]\d|2[0-3]):([0-5]\d):([0-5]\d)',
// Example: 08:30 AM, 12:45 pm
'(0[1-9]|1[0-2]):([0-5]\d)\s?([AaPp][Mm])',
// Example: 08:30 AM, 12:45 pm
'(0[1-9]|1[0-2]):([0-5]\d):([0-5]\d) ?([AaPp][Mm])'
)
)
),
// there are often emoji in the sender display name
(
any([sender.display_name, subject.subject],
// contains an emoji
regex.contains(.,
'[\x{1F300}-\x{1F5FF}\x{1F600}-\x{1F64F}\x{1F680}-\x{1F6FF}\x{1F700}-\x{1F77F}\x{1F780}-\x{1F7FF}\x{1F900}-\x{1F9FF}\x{2600}-\x{26FF}\x{2700}-\x{27BF}\x{2300}-\x{23FF}]'
)
// negate where the emoji occur in tags
and not regex.contains(.,
'^(?:\[[^\]]*\]\s*)*\[[^\]]*[\x{1F300}-\x{1F5FF}\x{1F600}-\x{1F64F}\x{1F680}-\x{1F6FF}\x{1F700}-\x{1F77F}\x{1F780}-\x{1F7FF}\x{1F900}-\x{1F9FF}\x{2600}-\x{26FF}\x{2700}-\x{27BF}\x{2300}-\x{23FF}][^\]]*\]'
)
)
),
// an attachment is a pdf, image, or document that contains a url
(
1 <= length(attachments) <= 2
and any(attachments,
(
.file_type in $file_types_images
or .file_type == "pdf"
or .file_extension in $file_extensions_macros
)
and any(file.explode(.),
.scan.qr.type == "url"
or strings.icontains(.scan.qr.data, 'http')
or any(recipients.to,
strings.icontains(..scan.qr.data, .email.local_part)
or strings.icontains(..scan.qr.data, .email.email)
)
)
)
)
)
// negating legit replies and legitimate audio file attachments and known voicemail senders
and not (
sender.email.domain.valid
and sender.email.domain.root_domain in (
"magicjack.com",
"unitelvoice.com",
"voipinterface.net",
"ringcentral.biz",
"verizonwireless.com",
"t-mobile.com",
"justcall.io",
"airtel.com"
)
)
and not (
any(filter(attachments, strings.starts_with(.content_type, "audio")),
// confirm the content type with file.explode
// we have seen attachments claim to be audio/* files, only to be exploded as something else
any(file.explode(.), strings.starts_with(.flavors.mime, "audio"))
)
)
and not (
(
strings.istarts_with(subject.subject, "RE:")
// out of office auto-reply
// the NLU model will handle these better natively soon
or strings.istarts_with(subject.subject, "Automatic reply:")
)
and (
length(headers.references) > 0
or any(headers.hops, any(.fields, strings.ilike(.name, "In-Reply-To")))
)
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
// bounce-back negations
and not any(attachments,
any(file.parse_eml(.).attachments,
.content_type == "message/delivery-status"
)
)
// bounce-back negations
and not (
any(attachments,
.content_type in ("message/delivery-status", "text/calendar")
)
)
// negate bouncebacks from proofpoint
and not (
sender.display_name == "Mail Delivery Subsystem"
and strings.ends_with(headers.message_id, "pphosted.com>")
and any(headers.hops,
.index == 0 and strings.contains(.received.server.raw, "pphosted.com")
)
and any(attachments, .content_type == "message/rfc822")
)
// an impersonated high trust domain
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
// sender profile
or (
(
not sender.email.domain.root_domain in $org_domains
and (profile.by_sender().prevalence not in ("common"))
and not profile.by_sender().solicited
)
or (
profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
and not profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign
)
// match if the sender is in org domains but failed auth
or (
sender.email.domain.domain in $org_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
)
)
Playground
Test against your own EMLs or sample data.