Employee impersonation with urgent request (untrusted sender)

type.inbound

// ensure the display name contains a space to avoid single named process accounts eg. 'billing, payment'
and strings.contains(sender.display_name, " ")
and sender.display_name in~ $org_display_names
and (
  any(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).intents,
      .name == "bec" and .confidence == "high"
  )
  or (
    (
      any(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).entities,
          .name == "urgency"
      )
      and any(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).entities,
              .name == "request"
      )
    )
    and not any(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).intents,
                .name == "benign" and .confidence == "high"
    )
    and (
      (
        // there are intents returned
        any(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).intents, true)
        // short body that also contains an org display name
        or (
          length(body.current_thread.text) > 200
          and any(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).entities,
                  .name == "sender" and .text in~ $org_display_names
          )
        )
      )
      and not strings.istarts_with(subject.subject, "fwd:")
    )
  )
)
and (
  (
    profile.by_sender().prevalence in ("new", "outlier")
    and not profile.by_sender().solicited
  )
  or (
    profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
    and not profile.by_sender().any_false_positives
  )
)

// negate org domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
  (
    sender.email.domain.root_domain in $org_domains
    and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
  )
  or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $org_domains
)

// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
  (
    sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
    and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
  )
  or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)

and not profile.by_sender().any_false_positives