• Sublime Core Feed
High Severity

EML attachment with credential theft language (unknown sender)

Description

Identifies EML attachments that use credential theft language from unknown senders.

References

No references.

Sublime Security
Created Nov 22nd, 2023 • Last updated Mar 17th, 2026
Source
type.inbound
// we don't look for links because it could be a QR code
and any(attachments,
        (.content_type == "message/rfc822" or .file_extension =~ "eml")
        and (
          // credential theft language in the attached EML
          any(ml.nlu_classifier(file.parse_eml(.).body.current_thread.text).intents,
              .name == "cred_theft" and .confidence == "high"
          )
          // credential theft language in an attachment in the attached EML
          or any(file.parse_eml(.).attachments,
                 any(ml.nlu_classifier(beta.ocr(.).text).intents,
                     .name == "cred_theft" and .confidence == "high"
                 )
          )
        )
        and not strings.like(file.parse_eml(.).sender.email.local_part,
                             "*postmaster*",
                             "*mailer-daemon*",
                             "*administrator*"
        )
        // some systems attach the bounceback this way
        and not any(file.parse_eml(.).attachments,
                    .content_type in (
                      "message/delivery-status",
                      "message/feedback-report"
                    )
        )
        // negate Microsoft Dynamic Delivery
        and not (
          length(file.parse_eml(.).attachments) == 0
          and strings.icontains(file.parse_eml(.).body.current_thread.text,
                                "Your attachments are currently being scanned by Safe Attachments"
          )
        )
        // Mimecast Protection attached EMLs when replacing attachments
        and not (
          (
            strings.iends_with(.file_name, 'was removed from this message')
            or .file_name == "We found suspicious links"
            or .file_name == 'We sent you safe versions of your files'
          )
          and length(file.parse_eml(.).headers.hops) == 1
          and any(file.parse_eml(.).headers.hops[0].fields,
                  .name == "X-MC-System"
          )
          and any(file.parse_eml(.).headers.hops[0].fields,
                  .name == "Content-Type"
                  and strings.contains(.value, '; boundary="MCBoundary=_')
          )
        )
)
// exclude bounce backs & read receipts
and not strings.like(sender.email.local_part,
                     "*postmaster*",
                     "*mailer-daemon*",
                     "*administrator*"
)
and not regex.icontains(subject.subject, "^(undelivered|undeliverable|read:)")
and not any(attachments,
            .content_type in (
              "message/delivery-status",
              "message/feedback-report"
            )
)
// if the "References" is in the body of the message, it's probably a bounce
and not any(headers.references, strings.contains(body.html.display_text, .))
and (
  not profile.by_sender_email().solicited
  or (
    profile.by_sender_email().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
    and not profile.by_sender_email().any_messages_benign
  )
  // sender address listed as a recipient
  or (
    length(recipients.to) == 1
    and sender.email.email in map(recipients.to, .email.email)
  )
)
and not profile.by_sender_email().any_messages_benign
// negate instances where proofpoint sends a review of a reported message via analyzer
and not (
  sender.email.email == "analyzer@analyzer.securityeducation.com"
  and any(headers.domains, .root_domain == "pphosted.com")
  and headers.auth_summary.spf.pass
  and headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
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