Medium Severity
Credential phishing: 'Secure message' and engaging language
Description
Body contains language resembling credential theft, and a "secure message" from an untrusted sender.
References
No references.
Sublime Security
Created Aug 17th, 2023 • Last updated Jul 16th, 2025
Feed Source
Sublime Core Feed
Source
type.inbound
and any(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).intents,
.name == "cred_theft" and .confidence == "high"
)
// ----- other suspicious signals here -----
and (
strings.icontains(body.html.display_text, "secure message")
or strings.icontains(body.html.display_text, "document portal")
or strings.icontains(body.html.display_text, "encrypted message")
)
// todo: automated display name / human local part
// todo: suspicious link (unfurl click trackers)
// ----------
// has at least 1 link
and length(body.links) > 0
// negate legitimate message senders
and (
sender.email.domain.root_domain not in ("protectedtrust.com")
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain != sender.email.domain.root_domain
)
// Negate known secure mailer(s)
and not all(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain in ("mimecast.com", "cisco.com", "csiesafe.com")
)
and any(headers.hops,
.index == 0
and not any(.fields,
strings.contains(.value,
'multipart/mixed; boundary="PROOFPOINT_BOUNDARY_1"'
)
)
)
and not (
length(filter(attachments,
strings.ilike(.file_name,
"logo.*",
"lock.gif",
"SecureMessageAtt.html"
)
)
) == 3
and any(attachments,
.file_type == "html"
and any(file.explode(.),
.scan.html.title == "Proofpoint Encryption"
and any(.scan.url.urls, strings.iends_with(.path, 'formpostdir/safeformpost.aspx'))
)
and strings.count(file.parse_html(.).raw, 'name="msg') > 3
)
)
and not (
any(headers.hops, any(.fields, .name == 'X-ZixNet'))
and any(headers.domains,
.root_domain in ("zixport.com", "zixcorp.com", "zixmail.net", "zixworks.com")
)
)
and not (
any(headers.hops, any(.fields, .name == 'X-SendInc-Message-Id'))
and any(headers.domains,
.root_domain in ("sendinc.net")
)
)
// negating Mimecast sends with MS banner and/or sender's email pulled out as a link
and not length(filter(body.links,
(
.display_text is null
and .display_url.url == sender.email.domain.root_domain
)
or .href_url.domain.root_domain in ("aka.ms", "mimecast.com", "cisco.com")
)
) == length(body.links)
)
and (
(
profile.by_sender().prevalence in ("new", "outlier")
and not profile.by_sender().solicited
)
or (
profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
and not profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign
)
)
and not profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Playground
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