type.inbound
// message contains links
and 0 < length(body.links) < 15
// NLU detects credential theft intent
and any(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).intents,
.name in ("cred_theft") and .confidence in ("medium", "high")
)
// REQUIRED: email must contain explicit copy-paste-to-terminal instruction
// or keystroke-only variant (e.g. press Windows+R, Ctrl+V, Enter) — UAT-11795/ClickFix
and (
(
strings.icontains(body.current_thread.text, "copy")
and (
strings.icontains(body.current_thread.text, "paste")
or strings.icontains(body.current_thread.text, "pasting")
)
and regex.icontains(body.current_thread.text,
'(?:terminal|powershell|command prompt|run dialog|win(?:dows)?\s*\+\s*r|\bcmd\b|mshta)'
)
)
or (
// keystroke-only variant — no copy/paste language, just key instructions
regex.icontains(body.current_thread.text,
'(?:ctrl\s*[+-]\s*v|press win(?:dows)?\s*\+\s*r)'
)
and regex.icontains(body.current_thread.text,
'(?:terminal|powershell|command prompt|run dialog|win(?:dows)?\s*\+r|\bcmd\b|mshta)'
)
)
)
// require 1 additional supporting signal
and 1 of (
// fake CAPTCHA or browser verification framing
regex.icontains(body.current_thread.text,
'(?:captcha|verify you are human|human verification|browser check|press windows|press win\s*\+\s*r|i am not a robot)'
),
// link resolves to or redirects through a suspicious TLD
any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.tld in $suspicious_tlds
or any(ml.link_analysis(., mode="aggressive").redirect_history,
.domain.tld in $suspicious_tlds
)
),
// freemail sender — should never send terminal instructions
sender.email.domain.domain in $free_email_providers
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC
and not (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
// and org_domains
or sender.email.domain.domain in $org_domains
)
and coalesce(headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, false)
)
Playground
Test against your own EMLs or sample data.