Callback Phishing via extensionless rfc822 attachment

type.inbound
and any(attachments,
        .file_type == "unknown"
        and .content_type == "message/rfc822"
        and any(file.explode(.),
                    strings.starts_with(.flavors.mime, "image")

                    // and Image contains callback phishing indicators
                    and 4 of (
                      strings.icontains(.scan.ocr.raw, "purchase"),
                      strings.icontains(.scan.ocr.raw, "subscription"),
                      strings.icontains(.scan.ocr.raw, "antivirus"),
                      strings.icontains(.scan.ocr.raw, "order"),
                      strings.icontains(.scan.ocr.raw, "support"),
                      strings.icontains(.scan.ocr.raw, "receipt"),
                      strings.icontains(.scan.ocr.raw, "amount"),
                      strings.icontains(.scan.ocr.raw, "charged"),
                      strings.icontains(.scan.ocr.raw, "invoice"),
                      strings.icontains(.scan.ocr.raw, "call"),
                      strings.icontains(.scan.ocr.raw, "cancel"),
                      strings.icontains(.scan.ocr.raw, "renew"),
                      strings.icontains(.scan.ocr.raw, "refund"),
                      strings.icontains(.scan.ocr.raw, "+1")
                    )
        )
        and any(file.explode(.),
                strings.ilike(.scan.ocr.raw,
                              "*geek*squad*",
                              "*lifelock*",
                              "*best buy*",
                              "*mcafee*",
                              "*norton*",
                              "*ebay*",
                              "*paypal*",
                              "*secure anywhere*"
                )
                or any(ml.nlu_classifier(.scan.ocr.raw).intents,
                       .name in ("callback_scam")
                       and .confidence == "high"
                       and length(body.current_thread.text) < 1500
                )
        )
)
and (
  not profile.by_sender().solicited
  and not profile.by_sender().any_false_positives
)

// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
  (
    sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
    and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
  )
  or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)