Description

Detects messages that impersonate Zoho Sign document-signing notifications by including a legitimate-looking guest signing link and forged thread references to a prior Zoho Sign notification, yet lack any authentic Zoho DKIM signature on the message. The lure typically poses as a colleague or business contact requesting review and signature of a document or proposal, aiming to lead recipients to a fraudulent signing page. Highly trusted sender domains that pass DMARC are excluded to reduce false positives.

References

No references.

Sublime Security
Created Nov 9th, 2026 • Last updated Nov 9th, 2026
Source
type.inbound
// zoho sign's notification footer is in the current message, not a quoted thread
and strings.icontains(body.current_thread.text,
                      "automated email from Zoho Sign"
)
// with somewhere to send the recipient... zoho's own report-abuse footer link doesn't count
and any(body.current_thread.links,
        .href_url.scheme in ("http", "https")
        and not (
          .href_url.domain.root_domain == "zoho.com"
          and strings.istarts_with(.href_url.path, "/report-abuse")
        )
)
// but it never left zoho sign's sending infra... regional DCs use ccTLD variants (.ca, .net.au, .net.uk, .uk)
and not any(headers.hops,
            regex.imatch(.received.source.raw,
                         '[^ (]+\.(?:transmail\.net(?:\.in)?|zeptomail\.(?:net(?:\.[a-z]{2})?|[a-z]{2})|zohomail360\.[a-z]{2}) .*'
            )
)
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