Brand impersonation: Microsoft with embedded logo and credential theft language

type.inbound
and (
  (
    length(attachments) > 0
    and all(attachments,
            .file_type in $file_types_images or .file_type == "pdf"
    )
  )
  or length(attachments) == 0
)
and any(ml.logo_detect(beta.message_screenshot()).brands,
        strings.starts_with(.name, "Microsoft")
)
and (
  any(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).intents,
      .name == "cred_theft" and .confidence in ("medium", "high")
  )
  or (
    length(body.current_thread.text) == 0
    and any(file.explode(beta.message_screenshot()),
            any(ml.nlu_classifier(.scan.ocr.raw).intents,
                .name == "cred_theft" and .confidence in ("medium", "high")
            )
    )
  )
)
and (
  not (
    headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
    and headers.auth_summary.dmarc.details.from.domain in (
      "azureadnotifications.us",
      "microsoft.com",
      "sharepointonline.com",
      "cloudappsecurity.com",
      "microsoftsupport.com",
      "microsoft.onmicrosoft.com",
      "yammer.com"
    )
  )
  or headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass is null
  or headers.auth_summary.dmarc.details.from.domain is null
)
and not (
  sender.email.domain.domain == "planner.office365.com"
  and headers.return_path.email == "noreply@planner.office365.com"
  and headers.auth_summary.dmarc.details.from.domain == "planner.office365.com"
)
// Microsoft has some legit onmicrosoft domains...
and not (
  sender.email.domain.domain == "microsoft.onmicrosoft.com"
  and headers.auth_summary.spf.pass
  and all(body.links, .href_url.domain.root_domain == "microsoft.com")
)
// message is not from sharepoint actual (additional check in case DMARC check above fails to bail out)
and not (
  strings.ilike(headers.message_id, '<Share-*', '<MassDelete-*')
  and strings.ends_with(headers.message_id, '@odspnotify>')
)
and (
  not profile.by_sender().solicited
  or (
    profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
    and not profile.by_sender().any_false_positives
  )
)

// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
  (
    sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
    and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
  )
  or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
and not profile.by_sender().any_false_positives