• Sublime Core Feed
Medium Severity

Attachment: RFC822 containing suspicious file sharing language with links from untrusted sender

Description

This rule identifies messages with an RFC822 attachment contains language indicative of suspicious file-sharing activity. It checks both the original sender and the nested sender against highly trusted domains. The original message is unsolicited, and has not been previously flagged as a false positive.

References

No references.

Sublime Security
Created Apr 3rd, 2024 • Last updated Nov 4th, 2025
Source
type.inbound
and any(attachments,
        .file_type == "unknown"
        and (.content_type == "message/rfc822" or .file_extension in ('eml'))
        and regex.contains(file.parse_eml(.).subject.subject,
                           '(shared.{0,30}with you|View Document)'
        )
        and 0 < length(file.parse_eml(.).body.links) < 10
        and file.parse_eml(.).sender.email.email not in $recipient_emails

        // exclude bounce backs & read receipts
        and not strings.like(file.parse_eml(.).sender.email.local_part,
                             "*postmaster*",
                             "*mailer-daemon*",
                             "*administrator*"
        )
        and not regex.imatch(file.parse_eml(.).subject.subject,
                             "(undeliverable|read:).*"
        )
        and not any(file.parse_eml(.).attachments,
                    .content_type == "message/delivery-status"
        )

        // negate highly trusted sender domains in the nested eml unless they fail DMARC
        and (
          (
            file.parse_eml(.).sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
            and (
              any(distinct(file.parse_eml(.).headers.hops,
                           .authentication_results.dmarc is not null
                  ),
                  strings.ilike(.authentication_results.dmarc, "*fail")
              )
            )
          )
          or file.parse_eml(.).sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
        )
        // negate org domains that passed dmarc
        and not file.parse_eml(.).sender.email.domain.root_domain in $org_domains
)

// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
  (
    sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
    and (
      any(distinct(headers.hops, .authentication_results.dmarc is not null),
          strings.ilike(.authentication_results.dmarc, "*fail")
      )
    )
  )
  or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
and (
  not profile.by_sender().solicited
  or (
    profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
    and not profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign
  )
)
and not profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign
MQL Rule Console
DocsLearning Labs

Playground

Test against your own EMLs or sample data.

Share

Post about this on your socials.

Get Started. Today.

Managed or self-managed. No MX changes.

Deploy and integrate a free Sublime instance in minutes.
Get Started