Attachment: QR code with credential phishing indicators

type.inbound
and 1 <= length(attachments) < 3

// Inspects image attachments for QR codes
and any(attachments,
        (.file_type in $file_types_images or .file_type == "pdf")
        and (
          any(file.explode(.),
              .scan.qr.type == "url"
              and not .scan.qr.url.domain.domain == "geico.app.link"
              and (
                // pass the QR URL to LinkAnalysis
                any([ml.link_analysis(.scan.qr.url)],
                    .credphish.disposition == "phishing"

                    // any routing traverses via $suspicious_tld list
                    or any(.redirect_history, .domain.tld in $suspicious_tlds)

                    // effective destination in $suspicious_tld list
                    or .effective_url.domain.tld in $suspicious_tlds

                    // or the effective destination domain is in $abuse_ch_urlhaus_domains_trusted_reporters
                    or .effective_url.domain.root_domain in $abuse_ch_urlhaus_domains_trusted_reporters

                    // or any files downloaded are zips or executables
                    or any(.files_downloaded,
                           .file_extension in $file_extensions_common_archives
                           or .file_extension in $file_extensions_executables
                    )
                )
                or (

                  // or the QR code's root domain is a url_shortener
                  .scan.qr.url.domain.root_domain in $url_shorteners
                  and (
                    not (
                      any(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).intents,
                          .name == "benign"
                      )
                      or any(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).entities,
                             .name == "disclaimer"
                      )
                    )
                    or not any(attachments,
                               any(file.explode(.),
                                   any(ml.nlu_classifier(.scan.ocr.raw).intents,
                                       .name == "benign"
                                   )
                               )
                    )
                    or (
                      any(recipients.to,
                          strings.icontains(..scan.qr.url.url, .email.email)
                      )
                    )
                  )

                  // exclude google maps
                  and not strings.starts_with(.scan.qr.url.url, 'https://goo.gl/maps')
                  and not strings.starts_with(.scan.qr.url.url, 'https://maps.app.goo.gl')
                )

                // the QR code url is a bing open redirect
                or .scan.qr.url.domain.root_domain == 'bing.com' and .scan.qr.url.path =~ '/ck/a'
                or (

                  // usap-dc open redirect
                  .scan.qr.url.domain.root_domain == "usap-dc.org"
                  and .scan.qr.url.path =~ "/tracker"
                  and strings.starts_with(.scan.qr.url.query_params, "type=dataset&url=http")
                )
              )
          )
        )
)
and (
  (
    profile.by_sender().prevalence in ("new", "outlier")
    and not profile.by_sender().solicited
  )
  or (
    profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
    and not profile.by_sender().any_false_positives
  )
)

// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
  (
    sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
    and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
  )
  or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)