Attachment: HTML smuggling with atob and high entropy via calendar invite

type.inbound
and any(attachments,
        (
          .file_extension =~ "ics"
          or .content_type == "text/calendar"
        )
        and any(file.explode(.),
                .scan.entropy.entropy >= 5
                and (
                  length(filter(.scan.javascript.identifiers,
                                strings.like(., "document", "write", "atob")
                         )
                  ) == 3
                  // usage: document['write'](atob)
                  or any(.scan.strings.strings, regex.icontains(., "document.{0,10}write.{0,10}atob"))
                  // usage: some_var = atob();
                  or any(.scan.strings.strings, regex.icontains(., "=.?atob.*;"))
                  // usage: atob(atob
                  or any(.scan.strings.strings, strings.ilike(., "*atob?atob*"))
                  // usage: {src: atob
                  or any(.scan.strings.strings, strings.ilike(., "*{src: atob*"))
                  // usage: eval(atob)
                  or any(.scan.strings.strings, strings.ilike(., "*eval?atob*"))
                    // usage: atob(_0x)
                  or any(.scan.strings.strings, strings.ilike(., "*atob(?0x*"))
                  // usage : 'at'+'ob'
                  or any(.scan.strings.strings, strings.ilike(., "*'at'+'ob'*"))
                  // usage: obfuscating "atob"
                  or any(.scan.javascript.identifiers, strings.ilike(., '*ato\u0062*'))
                  // usage: document.head.insertAdjacentHTML("beforeend", atob(...
                  or any(.scan.strings.strings,
                         strings.ilike(.,
                                       "*document*insertAdjacentHTML*atob*"
                         )
                  )
                )
        )
)
// negate bouncebacks and undeliverables
and not any(attachments,
            .content_type in (
              "message/global-delivery-status",
              "message/delivery-status"
            )
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
  (
    sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
    and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
  )
  or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)