Attachment: Encrypted PDF with credential theft body

type.inbound
and any(filter(attachments, .file_type == "pdf"),
        any(file.explode(.),
            any(.scan.exiftool.fields, .key == "Encryption")
            or (
              .scan.entropy.entropy > 7
              and any(.scan.strings.strings, strings.icontains(., "/Encrypt"))
            )
        )
        // Encrypted PDFs do not have child nodes with any data
        and all(filter(file.explode(.), .depth > 0), .size == 0)
)
and (
  any(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).intents,
      .name == "cred_theft" and .confidence in ("medium", "high")
  )
  or any(ml.nlu_classifier(beta.ocr(file.message_screenshot()).text).intents,
         .name == "cred_theft" and .confidence in ("medium", "high")
  )
  or (
    (
      regex.icontains(body.current_thread.text,
                      'PDF\s*(?:Access|Preview|Unlock|Decrypt)\s*(?:Pass)?code',
                      '(Access|Preview|Unlock|Decrypt|Pass)\s*(?:word|code)\s*to?\s*PDF\s*is?\s*:'
      )
      or (
        (
          length(body.current_thread.text) <= 10
          or (body.current_thread.text is null)
        )
        and any(body.previous_threads,
                regex.icontains(.text,
                                'PDF\s*(?:Access|Preview|Unlock|Decrypt)\s*(?:Pass)?code',
                                '(Access|Preview|Unlock|Decrypt|Pass)\s*(?:word|code)\s*to?\s*PDF\s*is?\s*:'
                )
        )
      )
    )
  )
)
// not forwards/replies
and not (
  (length(headers.references) > 0 or headers.in_reply_to is not null)
  and (subject.is_forward or subject.is_reply)
  and length(body.previous_threads) >= 1
)
and (
  (
    profile.by_sender_email().prevalence in ("new", "outlier")
    and not profile.by_sender_email().solicited
  )
  or (
    profile.by_sender_email().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
    and not profile.by_sender_email().any_messages_benign
  )
  or (
    length(recipients.to) == 0
    or all(recipients.to,
           strings.ilike(.display_name, "undisclosed?recipients")
    )
  )
  or (
    length(recipients.to) == 1
    and any(recipients.to, .email.email == sender.email.email)
  )
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
  (
    sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
    and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
  )
  or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)