• Sublime Core Feed
Medium Severity

Attachment: Callback Phishing solicitation via text file with a large unknown recipient list

Labels

Callback Phishing
Evasion
Out of band pivot
Social engineering
Content analysis
File analysis
Header analysis
Sender analysis

Description

Callback Phishing via text file attachment, with a large number of recipients that are unknown to the organization, and a short body and subject from an unknown sender.

References

No references.

Sublime Security
Created Apr 8th, 2024 • Last updated Apr 8th, 2024
Feed Source
Sublime Core Feed
Source
GitHub
type.inbound
and (
  length(recipients.to) > 10
  and length(filter(recipients.to,
                    .email.domain.domain not in $org_domains
                    and .email.email not in $recipient_emails
                    and (
                      .email.domain.valid
                      or strings.icontains(.display_name, "undisclosed")
                    )
             )
  ) >= 10
)
and length(subject.subject) <= 10
and length(body.links) == 0
and (body.current_thread.text is null or length(body.current_thread.text) < 50)
and 0 < length(attachments) < 4
and any(attachments,
        .content_type == "text/plain"
        and any(file.explode(.),
                any(.scan.strings.strings,
                    strings.ilike(.,
                                  "*mcafee*",
                                  "*norton*",
                                  "*geek squad*",
                                  "*paypal*",
                                  "*ebay*",
                                  "*symantec*",
                                  "*best buy*",
                                  "*lifelock*"
                    )
                    and any(..scan.strings.strings,
                            regex.icontains(.,
                                            '\b\+?(\d{1}.)?\(?\d{3}?\)?.\d{3}.?\d{4}\b'
                            )
                    )
                )
        )
)
and profile.by_sender().prevalence != "common"
and not profile.by_sender().solicited
and not profile.by_sender().any_false_positives

// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
  (
    sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
    and (
      any(distinct(headers.hops, .authentication_results.dmarc is not null),
          strings.ilike(.authentication_results.dmarc, "*fail")
      )
    )
  )
  or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)

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